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Abstract 
Australia and New Zealand, like other countries, have unique TV systems and practices that shape the possibilities ena-
bled by emerging technologies, enterprises, behaviors and ideas. This article explores two recent articulations of the 
concept of television that have motivated ‘end of television’ narratives in the two countries. One is future-oriented – 
the introduction of online subscription video services from local providers like Fetch TV, Presto, Stan and from March 
2015, the international giant Netflix. It draws on a survey of senior people in TV, technology, advertising, production, 
audience measurement and social media conducted in late 2014 and early 2015. The other is recent history – the 
switchover from analogue to digital terrestrial television, completed in both countries in December 2013. Digital TV 
switchover was a global policy implemented in markedly different ways. Television was transformed, though not in the 
precise ways anticipated. Rather than being in the center of the digital revolution, as the digital TV industry and policy 
pioneers enthused, broadcast television was, to some extent, overrun by it. The most successful online subscription 
video service in Australia and New Zealand so far, Netflix, talks up the end of television but serves up a very specific 
form of it. The article poses a slightly different question to whether or not television is ending: that is, whether, in the 
post-broadcast, digital era, distinctions between unique TV systems and practices will endure, narrow, dissolve, or 
morph into new forms of difference. 
Keywords 
digital switchover; digital television; Netflix; subscription video; SVOD; television; video 
Issue 
This article is part of the issue “(Not Yet) the End of Television”, edited by Milly Buonanno (University of Roma “La 
Sapienza”, Italy). 
© 2016 by the author; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY). 
 
1. Introduction 
Asked in early 2015 whether, by 2025, there would still 
be something called television, Fetch TV CEO Scott Lor-
son replied: “Yes—but I don’t know what it will be 
called!” Fetch TV is a subscription service available in 
Australia since 2010 that plans to expand to New Zea-
land. Customers sign up through their internet service 
providers or a retailer and get a set-top-box/personal-
video-recorder that provides access to broadcast, sub-
scription, transactional and online content. They can 
watch and record broadcast channels and access the 
networks’ catch-up TV services. They can watch around 
40 premium English-language channels as part of the 
basic package and pay extra for Netflix and Asian lan-
guage channel packages. They can rent or buy from a 
library of over 4,000 movies and buy episodes or sea-
sons of TV shows. They can use web-based apps like 
YouTube for TV. All of this can be done on TV sets or on 
iOS and Android mobile devices using free apps. 
Fetch TV’s stated goal is to ‘Make TV Better’. Like 
the service, the organisation is a hybrid, founded and 
based in Australia and majority-owned by Australians 
but with a large equity stake held by Malaysian-based 
Astro All Asia Networks. Scott Lorson, appointed CEO 
of the start-up business in 2009, is a dual Australian/US 
citizen with degrees in science and business manage-
ment from the University of California at Berkeley, and 
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a diverse business background in consumer finance, 
telecommunications and media (Fell, 2011). He is plac-
ing many wagers on the future of television. “We are 
effectively spreading our chips on the table by betting 
that a complete solution offering FTA [free-to-air, or 
broadcast], SVOD, TVOD and traditional linear sub-
scription will be required to win the living room and 
that all important HDMI1 position” (Groves, 2015). It is 
a hybrid strategy, acknowledging that television is now 
many things that are used by consumers in many ways, 
but it also asserts the continuing importance of scarci-
ties or bottlenecks: the HDMI connections at house-
hold TV receivers and the individual consumers that 
Fetch TV’s advertising encourages to ‘Show TV who’s 
boss’. Fetch TV does not imagine the end of television, 
or even the end of a particular kind of television. In-
stead, it proposes to integrate many different kinds of 
television within a single subscription service, embrac-
ing and profiting from the diversification of TV’s forms.  
This article explores two recent articulations of the 
concept of television that have motivated ‘end of tele-
vision’ narratives in Australia and New Zealand. One is 
future-oriented—the introduction of online subscrip-
tion video services from local providers like Fetch TV, 
and from March 2015, the international giant Netflix. 
The other is recent history—the switchover from ana-
logue to digital terrestrial television, completed in both 
countries in December 2013. The analysis of online 
subscription video services draws on a survey of 25 
senior people in TV, technology, advertising, produc-
tion, audience measurement and social media, con-
ducted in late 2014 and early 2015. The discussion of 
the transition from analogue to digital broadcast tele-
vision builds on research conducted throughout that 
long process (see Given, 1998, 2003, 2007, 2015). 
Television scholars have suggested many ways to 
summarise and explain the medium’s history. Writing 
about TV in the United States, Amanda Lotz proposes 
three phases: the Network Era (1950s–1970s), the Mul-
tichannel Transition (1980s and 1990s), and the Post-
Network Era. She describes a gradual transition from 
the first era, when viewers watched single TV sets in 
homes, chose from among a small set of options 
scheduled by network programmers and shared a fairly 
uniform viewing experience, to the current era, with its 
multiplicity of devices, service providers, forms of con-
tent and modes of viewing. The Network Era drew its 
enterprises and its dominant organizational form from 
radio broadcasting and scheduled types of programs 
through the days and seasons in ways that came to 
seem natural, as if they were intrinsic to the medium. 
During the Multichannel Transition, novel technologies 
including remote controls, VCRs, cable transmission and 
people meters provided new ways to deliver, choose, 
watch and measure US television; direct subscription 
provided a new way to pay for it. Specialized channels 
became popular and profitable enough to commission 
their own programs, encouraging the fragmentation of 
individual viewing that multiple sets in households ena-
bled. Lotz initially envisaged the Post Network Era as “an 
erosion of network and channel control”, but came to 
imagine a primarily non-linear future “devoid of net-
works or channels” (Lotz, 2014, pp. 21-34). 
William Uricchio proposes similar phases but re-
names them to emphasise the role of viewer interfaces 
in each—Dial Television (1950–1975), Remote Control 
(1975–1999) and From TiVo to YouTube (1999+)—and 
challenges the lingering perception of stability in the 
first era. He sets out eight further conditions that de-
fine the medium in each of these eras, including 
scheduling (‘real time’, time shifting, on-demand), 
amount of content (scarcity, plenty, unlimited), audi-
ences (mass, segmented, niche) and metrics (stable, 
under siege, complete datasets). The first period, 
roughly equating to Lotz’ Network Era, has come to rep-
resent the “conceptual default definition” for television, 
says Uricchio, although he contends it is “but a blip in 
the larger developmental history of the medium”. Unlike 
film, radio and print, television “has from the start 
demonstrated an unusually opportunistic potential with 
regard to technological platforms”. The present changes, 
he argues, are not so much “the end of television as a 
return to the pluriformity that has long characterized the 
medium” (Uricchio, 2009, pp. 60-72). 
Television’s pluriformity is especially striking when 
the focus shifts from the United States to the rest of 
the world. A common observation is that television has 
been different at different times and in different places 
(see for example Given, 2003, p. 20). “The fact is”, 
writes Graeme Turner, “especially since the digital rev-
olution and notwithstanding the processes of globaliza-
tion, ‘television’ involves such varying forms, platforms, 
and content in its different national and regional loca-
tions that it is increasingly implausible for one set of 
experiences to be regarded as representative” (Turner, 
2011, p. 32). Features that seem central to the distinc-
tive shape of the medium at one time and place often 
emerged earlier or later or not at all in other places. 
For this article, focused on television in Australia and 
New Zealand (which I will call A/NZ, when referring to 
them as a region rather than as separate nation states 
or markets), there are a number of important differ-
ences from the US television of Lotz’ and Uricchio’s 
phases, including significant variations between the 
two Antipodean markets themselves. The most im-
portant differences lie in local and national program 
production, the level of commercialization, the scale of 
national networks, the existence of public broadcasters 
serving cultural diversity objectives and the degree of 
multichannel cable and satellite TV take-up. 
First, arguably the most important single policy is-
sue raised by television in both countries has been its 
contribution to distinctive local and national cultural 
and industrial development. Early television was domi-
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nated by British and American programs; the develop-
ment of the medium was marked by the increasing 
production and popularity of local programs, and 
hence the differences between the actual programs 
seen by A/NZ and overseas audiences. This is what 
made TV unlike the audio-visual medium that preceded 
it, film, where the local box office was and is dominat-
ed by Hollywood movies. Australian TV drama had its 
first big success in the 1960s and increasingly effective 
program quotas plus government tax concessions and 
subsidies in the 1980s helped generate a boom, espe-
cially in Australian historical mini-series. In New Zea-
land, the big local drama breakthrough did not come 
until the early 1990s after the newly-established fund-
ing agency New Zealand on Air supported a daily serial, 
Shortland Street. Some regulation had encouraged a 
common A/NZ audio-visual space from the outset: Aus-
tralia required all advertising to be produced locally 
and allowed New Zealand commercials to qualify. From 
the mid–1990s, New Zealand programs have qualified 
for Australian program quotas.  
Second, US-based phases take for granted a level of 
commercialization of television that was internationally 
uncommon at the time of its ‘Network Era’. This was 
highlighted by many European analyses of change in 
the industry from the late 1980s, when liberalization 
and privatization removed some of the sharp distinc-
tions between television markets on each side of the 
Atlantic. New Zealand’s early television system was a 
state monopoly until the late 1980s, like so many in Eu-
rope; Australia’s was a ‘dual system’, combining three-
commercial-station competition in the largest four cit-
ies with a publicly-funded national broadcaster.  
Third, Australia’s three commercial stations took a 
long time to generate the truly national commercial 
networks that quickly characterized US TV. Restrictions 
in place until the late 1980s on the numbers of stations 
in non-metropolitan markets and on common owner-
ship meant that even the national capital, Canberra, 
just 300km from Sydney, had only one commercial sta-
tion for around 30 years. Television’s reach was limited 
by a combination of politics, economics and geogra-
phy—topography in New Zealand’s case, distance in 
Australia’s—and ‘equalising’ access to the same ser-
vices as city-dwellers became a durable policy issue. 
Satellite technology was transformational, and not just 
in delivering TV to remote households for the first 
time. In Australia, the debate about how to use it to 
expand TV services drove a fundamental overhaul of 
regulation that precipitated significant structural 
change in the industry and finally allowed the creation 
of fully national commercial networks. 
Fourth, both countries created publicly-funded 
broadcasters, separate from their well-established na-
tional broadcasters, to reflect and shape their nations’ 
distinctive cultural origins and diversity. Australia’s, the 
SBS, came first, beginning regular TV broadcasts in 1980, 
and was followed by a National Indigenous Television 
service in 2007 that became part of SBS in 2012. New 
Zealand’s Maori Television began broadcasting in 2004. 
Fifth, Australia and New Zealand came later to mul-
tichannel subscription television than the US, Australia 
much later. Having arrived early at US-style three-
commercial station competition in the largest cities in 
the mid–1960s, Australia’s incumbent broadcasters 
successfully resisted the introduction of multichannel 
competition until 1995. This did not simply defer a 
‘Multichannel Transition’, because other changes, such 
as the arrival of commercial internet services and the 
DVD format, still occurred in the mid/late 1990s as in 
the US. Cable and satellite television faced much more 
competition and only ever reached around 50% of 
households in New Zealand and just 30% in Australia, 
where tough ‘anti-siphoning’ rules also prevented pay 
TV channels acquiring exclusive rights to a long list of 
the most popular sporting events. This was nothing like 
the almost universal take-up it achieved in the US—it 
remained a premium service rather than becoming a 
utility—and changed the opportunities and challenges 
posed by subsequent developments. Digital TV services 
offered most Australian viewers their first multichannel 
TV experience; digital TV switchover was especially 
sensitive because so many TV viewers still relied on 
over-the-air transmission; online subscription video 
services did not require consumers to cut or shave 
cords—most did not have one—but to pay for ‘televi-
sion’ for the first time. 
In summary, while there is plenty in the US phases 
that is recognizable in Australia’s and New Zealand’s 
television history, especially the long, gradual shift 
from network or station control towards increasing 
viewer choice and a wider range of viewing and using 
practices, there is also plenty that is distinctive, espe-
cially about the timing of events that involved govern-
ment action (the expansion of services and technical 
changes like colour and digital TV), and therefore the 
precise combination of factors in play at any time. 
These have given rise to unique TV systems and prac-
tices that shape the possibilities enabled by emerging 
technologies, enterprises, behaviours and ideas. They 
prompt a slightly different question to whether or not 
television is ending: that is whether, in the Post Net-
work, TiVo-to-YouTube, Post TV, Post Broadcast, digital 
era, these distinctions will endure, narrow, dissolve, or 
morph into new forms of difference. This article tries to 
answer this question by analysing the pre-history, 
launch and response to Netflix’s arrival in A/NZ and 
contrasting it with the introduction of digital TV in the 
early 2000s. The emphasis on Netflix highlights the role 
of drama programming in television’s future; the dis-
cussion of digital TV reminds us that drama is just one 
part of what television has been and might be in the 
future. 
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2. The Netflix Moment 
2.1. Noticing Netflix 
Netflix was noticed in Australia and New Zealand as 
soon as a significant number of customers started sign-
ing up to the mail order subscription DVD rental busi-
ness launched in the United States in September 1999 
(Netflix, 2003). Helpfully, one was the brother-in-law of 
a Sydney Morning Herald journalist, giving the Califor-
nia start-up a distant Australian influencer: “Netflix is a 
delicious service that could work here given Australia 
Post’s express mail service, and my hope is that if I 
keep talking about it someone will pick up on the idea” 
(Easdown, 2002). Across the Tasman Sea in New Zea-
land, a 35-year-old IT consultant tried to do just that. 
Netflix declined his request to establish a local fran-
chise, so he launched his own DVD rental business, fat-
so.co.nz, in July 2004. 
Rejecting such overtures, the young Netflix deter-
mined and revealed its strategy for any future overseas 
expansion. The company was not ‘born global’; it was 
local but with global aspirations. ‘Born Globals’, accord-
ing to one contemporary definition, “seek out interna-
tional business through the application of resources to 
the sale of output in multiple countries within three 
years’ of…establishment” (Li, G. Qian, & Z. Qian, 2012). 
Netflix did not do this, but once it did pursue interna-
tional markets, it aimed to be a truly global operator 
rather than a US-based business with international 
franchises or affiliates. This meant its strategies for ac-
quiring and eventually commissioning programming 
would have disruptive implications for a business that 
was overwhelmingly territorial. “[W]e are kind of alone 
in the space of buying [global] rights”, said chief con-
tent officer Ted Sarandos in December 2015. “It’s a 
pretty big change and at the end of the day it’s a real 
structural change” (Sarandos, 2015). 
Many similar online DVD services were established 
in Australia and New Zealand in the early 2000s. Like 
Netflix, they were initially seen mainly as challengers to 
bricks-and-mortar DVD stores. Their names self-
identified most as film services at a time before the 
boom in TV programming on DVD. (In 2003, 70% of 
DVD sales revenues in Australia were for movies and 
just 13% for TV series—the rest was mainly music, chil-
dren’s and documentaries. See GfK/Screen Australia, 
2015). An internet entrepreneur founded Webflicks in 
Australia in 2002; Movieshack started in Auckland and 
Quickflix in Perth in 2004. Some TV operators took 
stakes in the emerging sector. New Zealand’s satellite 
subscription TV incumbent, Sky TV, acquired an online 
DVD start-up, DVD Unlimited, around the time Fatso 
was founded. Major A/NZ cinema exhibitor Hoyts, then 
controlled by Australia’s most powerful TV broadcaster 
Kerry Packer, launched Homescreen in 2003, arguing it 
was “a natural extension of the company’s film and 
cinema business” (Groves, 2003). Telcos got involved 
as well: Australia’s Telstra established fetchmemovies 
in 2004, then rebadged it with their ISP brand, as Big-
Pond Movies; Optus entered into a marketing ar-
rangement with Quickflix (Best, 2004). 
Also like Netflix, A/NZ DVD mail order services gen-
erally saw their technology and distribution process as 
transitional, a first move into a business that would 
eventually shift to online digital delivery (see Keating, 
2013, p. 48). Netflix started a streaming service in the 
US in 2007 which it extended to Canada in 2010 and 
Latin America and the Caribbean the following year. 
The telcos, especially, saw online video as a big oppor-
tunity. Telstra’s BigPond sold its DVD mail order busi-
ness to Quickflix in 2011 after launching online stream-
ing and downloads. Quickflix started its own digital 
service in Australia in 2011 (Curtis, Given, & McCutch-
eon, 2012, p. 31) then launched as a digital-only service 
in New Zealand the following year (Pullar-Strecker, 
2012). Online video was where so many media, com-
munications and IT businesses seemed to be converg-
ing—as well as the telcos and TV operators, online vid-
eo services were launched or announced by local DVD 
retailers and cinema exhibitors, as well as international 
search and consumer device giants. Google acquired 
YouTube in 2006 and launched separate Australian and 
New Zealand versions of the site in 2007 (infonewsNZ, 
2007). Apple launched the iTunes Australian music 
store in October 2005, added television programs to it 
in June 2008 and a film catalogue in August 2008. 
Unlike the US, where the first mover Netflix estab-
lished itself as the market leader first in online DVD 
rentals and then in subscription streaming, the early 
online DVD enterprises in A/NZ consolidated and many 
investors sold out. New Zealand’s three merged in 2008 
into a company controlled by Sky TV but trading under 
the Fatso brand (Scott, 2008). Homescreen was sold to 
Quickflix in 2005 and the latter’s ownership went 
through many changes. Lachlan Murdoch’s Illyria and 
the regional TV network WIN bought in then sold out; 
HBO did the same in 2012, selling to Nine Entertain-
ment Corporation, owner of the Nine TV network. Each 
of these seemed to be preparing to use Quickflix’s busi-
ness as their vehicle for entering the A/NZ video stream-
ing market, before settling on another route. Some 
speculated that Netflix itself would do that; like the oth-
ers, it seems to have decided it could win the customers 
without having to pay for them (Kohler, 2015). 
2.2. Watching Netflix 
Once Netflix launched its streaming service in the Unit-
ed States in 2007, technically literate overseas custom-
ers started subscribing to it using virtual private net-
works (VPNs) that masked their location. Without 
launching a global service, Netflix became a global en-
terprise. This cross-border ‘pre-history’, lasting until 
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the formal launch of Netflix in Australia and New Zea-
land in March 2015, had precedents. New Zealanders 
listened fortuitously to Australian long wave radio sta-
tions in the 1920s until the wavelengths used in Aus-
tralia were changed to enable more local stations to be 
licensed and to improve listening quality. Canadians liv-
ing along the US border watched American television 
well before the CBC commenced TV services in Quebec 
and Toronto in 1952; some in Ireland received BBC TV 
signals for fifteen years after its post-war relaunch, be-
fore RTE officially started TV in the Republic. In each 
case, broadcasting acquired a national identity that 
was not intrinsic to the technology. The official begin-
nings of TV are generally remembered as the moments 
when a national operator commenced transmission in-
side the territory. More accurately, these pre-histories 
demonstrate the technical, political, economic, geo-
graphic and cultural contingencies of the official insti-
tutional forms.  
Such transnational contingencies also had counter-
parts within nations. To Sydney’s north and south, 
many homes in Newcastle and Wollongong retain the 
tall external antennae erected to receive TV from Syd-
ney stations before local ones launched in the early 
1960s. They continued to be used for the nearly three 
decades that non-metropolitan centres had only one 
commercial station while Sydney had three. A young 
Rupert Murdoch bought into the commercial TV sta-
tion in Wollongong, about 90km south of Sydney, in 
1963, intending to use its signal overlap to broadcast to 
a large proportion of Sydney viewers. Already a deal-
making opportunist, he settled for a 25% stake in one of 
the Sydney licensees instead! Tensions like these had 
popular, commercial and policy consequences. Local sta-
tions got big audiences for local news programs but not 
for the foreign programs their audiences had already 
seen on the Sydney channels, leading to tussles with 
overseas program suppliers (Herd, 2012, pp. 102-104). 
The unofficial availability and official unavailability of 
Netflix in A/NZ from 2007 became a significant part of a 
wider struggle about pricing and access to media con-
tent and the quality of broadband infrastructure. Con-
sumer group CHOICE commissioned research that found 
340,000 Australian households were accessing Netflix in 
November 2014, four months before its official launch, 
and nearly 700,000 were subscribing to at least one 
overseas content provider or buying direct through an 
overseas store like iTunes USA. (CHOICE, 2014) Even 
months after the service launched officially in A/NZ, 
“tens of thousands” of New Zealanders were believed to 
be accessing the US version of the service, according to 
an unattributed estimate (Pullar-Strecker, 2015a). 
Netflix’ low cost highlighted the premium pricing 
strategies of the near-monopoly cable and satellite TV 
operators in the two territories, Foxtel and Sky, and the 
lack of flexibility in their channel bundles. The prices of 
IT hardware and software products from international 
vendors like Apple, Microsoft and Adobe were the tar-
get of a 2013 parliamentary committee inquiry which 
found that Australians often paid 50%–100% more for 
the same products than their counterparts in compa-
rable economies. “Particularly when it comes to digital-
ly delivered content…many IT products are more ex-
pensive in Australia because of regional pricing 
strategies implemented by major vendors and copy-
right holders. Consumers often refer to these pricing 
strategies as the ‘Australia tax’.” (House of Representa-
tives Standing Committee on Infrastructure and Com-
munications, 2013, p. viii) Already aware of delays be-
tween US and A/NZ TV transmission dates, especially 
for big US drama series, unofficial access to the US Net-
flix service gave viewers a more legitimate way besides 
unauthorised P2P file-sharing for getting timely access 
to at least some titles. Broadcasters and the cable and 
satellite operators responded with ‘Express from the 
US’ scheduling, and made episodes of marquee series 
available online at strange hours, as soon as they had 
screened overseas, such as the ABC did with Series 7 of 
Doctor Who in 2012 (Kidman, 2012). Large public in-
vestments in fixed line broadband were announced by 
both the Australian and New Zealand governments in 
2009 (Given, 2010) but a Netflix executive told a 2011 
conference in Auckland that poor household take-up of 
fast broadband was one of the reasons his company 
had not launched a service there (Gruenwedel, 2011). 
In all these debates, Netflix was often represented 
as a liberator for far-away consumers. “It is remarkable 
that a service which is officially blocked to Australi-
ans…and doesn’t spend a cent on local marketing…is 
the biggest single driver of competition in our enter-
tainment market”, said a spokesperson for CHOICE. 
“It’s a perfect case study of how competition from in-
ternational markets can shake up protected industries 
and deliver benefits for Australian consumers” 
(CHOICE, 2014). Yet, from many perspectives, the Cali-
fornia-based company was a surprising saviour. Digital 
consumers had criticised record companies and sub-
scription TV operators for bundling content into al-
bums and channel packages that forced consumers to 
buy things they didn’t want along with those they did. 
The unbundling of songs, movies and TV shows by 
iTunes had been welcomed, but the celebration was 
brief: now Netflix, like Spotify in music, was attracting 
customers with all-you-can-eat monthly subscriptions, 
though at much lower price-points than multichannel 
subscription TV operators. Netflix was not the long-
promised digital fantasy, Paul Goldstein’s ‘celestial 
jukebox’ (2003), offering all the video content ever 
made, but a carefully chosen collection. The collection 
was large, certainly, but just as important were the 
company’s skills at directing subscribers around it and 
learning from their choices. Like other members of a 
large chorus of over-the-top (OTT) service providers, 
Netflix lamented the state of fixed line broadband in 
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Australia and New Zealand that disappointed video 
consumers, but its solution was not to invest in that 
crucial element of its delivery infrastructure, but to 
support the heavy public investments proposed by 
governments and their taxpayers. 
One of the factors that seems to have appealed most 
about Netflix to many consumers was that it was a new 
entrant into these distant markets (see Pash, 2014). It 
was not one of the local mainstream media incumbents, 
those products of decades of policy that had been de-
signed to make national media systems distinctive, but 
who were now increasingly blamed for the fact that 
those national media systems were not delivering an 
identikit of services available elsewhere. Of those in-
cumbent ‘dinosaurs’, probably the most criticised—the 
titanosaurs—were the broadcast television networks. 
2.3. Anticipating Netflix 
Netflix’ structure and business model for delivering 
video online was quite different to the TV networks 
and most other incumbent A/NZ video providers. It 
was a standalone business and it charged for its con-
tent. A 2012 analysis of 25 video-heavy websites pop-
ular with Australian internet users (Curtis et al., 2012) 
noted the overwhelming majority offered content 
without direct charge to consumers. These ‘free’ ser-
vices were funded by advertising, public funding (na-
tional broadcaster sites), cross-subsidy from other ac-
tivities or a combination.  
Most were controlled by entities with other inter-
ests, so the online video services were part of wider 
business strategies. Eight were catch-up sites con-
trolled by Australian-based broadcasters, eleven were 
controlled by other kinds of media and communica-
tions enterprises and just six were standalone online 
video operations. Two of the broadcasters operated 
their online presence in partnership with US-based 
companies, Yahoo! (Seven) and Microsoft (Nine). Of 
the other kinds of media and communications enter-
prises, major US technology companies were promi-
nent—Google (YouTube and Google Video, which was 
subsequently effectively integrated into YouTube), Ap-
ple (iTunes), Amazon (IMDb), Microsoft (Bing Video and 
the stake in ninemsn, subsequently restructured as Mi9, 
wholly owned by Nine Entertainment Corporation, but 
retaining a relationship with Microsoft technology and 
advertising products) and InterActiveCorp (Vimeo). Two 
were international production and distribution compa-
nies, Disney and FremantleMedia (controlling the 
Neighbours program site); two were telecommunica-
tions companies, Australia’s Telstra (BigPond Movies) 
and France Telecom-Orange (which sold a controlling 
stake in Daily Motion to Vivendi in 2015); and one was 
the A/NZ newspaper company Fairfax Media (SMH TV). 
Of the six standalone operations, three were P2P Bit-
Torrent sites (each undergoing significant change 
since), two were the video sharing and search sites 
MetaCafe and Blinkx, and the other was Quickflix. 
The study did not include Netflix, which was still 
three years from launching an official Australian ser-
vice. For a time, some suggested it was doing well 
enough from VPN customers without the expense of 
launching an official service, certainly well enough for 
the incumbents to feel they needed to respond. In New 
Zealand, Sky and the dominant broadcast network, the 
still state-owned TVNZ, launched a joint pay–TV-lite 
service, Igloo TV, in late 2012 (Keall, 2012), and online 
subscription video services were launched in 2014 by 
Sky (Neon) and the telco Spark (Lightbox) (Slabbert, 
2014). In Australia, subscription TV operator Foxtel 
launched the Presto online movie service in March 
2014, halved its price in August, brought in Seven West 
Media (which owns the top-rating Seven Network) as a 
partner in December, and added TV programs to it in 
January 2015. Free-to-air TV rival Nine Entertainment 
joined with Fairfax Media in August 2014 to announce 
the online video service Stan, and launched it on Aus-
tralia Day, 26 January 2015.  
Netflix finally ended the rumours in November 
2014, confirming it would start the service in Australia 
and New Zealand that began on 24 March 2015. Sever-
al industry representatives interviewed around this 
time for a study of the future of TV predicted consoli-
dation in the sector. Said Overture Management’s Ben 
Liebmann (ex-Shine360): 
“No matter what the local providers can throw at it, 
Netflix has deeper pockets. It has global scale, and it 
has time. While it may not have the most extraordi-
nary content offering on day one, it can wait, and sit 
it out till broadcast and pay TV rights come up and 
then it can swoop. At some point I suspect there will 
be Netflix and probably one other. And the one other 
will be a great competitor because it will eventually 
have Seven, Nine, Ten, ABC, SBS, Foxtel, all in one.” 
(Given, Brealey, & Gray, 2015, p. 24) 
2.4. Launching Netflix 
Two features of Netflix’s launch in Australia and New 
Zealand in March 2015 provide striking contrasts with 
earlier phases in television history. First, official TV ser-
vices started in New Zealand several years after Aus-
tralia’s in 1956; Netflix launched simultaneously in the 
two territories, an implicit recognition of an increasing-
ly shared cross-Tasman audio-visual marketplace. The-
atrical distributors have licensed A/NZ rights together 
for decades, the major cinema chains operate in both 
markets, Sky News delivers a 24-hour news channel to 
both markets, and the biggest New Zealand and Aus-
tralian newspapers are all owned by Fairfax, News Lim-
ited and APN, which also controls commercial radio 
networks in the two countries. 
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Second, Netflix was an outsider. The technology of 
broadcast television was first deployed by local and na-
tional media incumbents—in NZ, the BCNZ; in Austral-
ia, the ABC and commercial companies in Sydney and 
Melbourne formed by the major newspapers. New 
Zealand had welcomed TV outsiders soon after private 
TV services were first authorized in the late 1980s. The 
Canadian CanWestGlobal bought into TV3 and eventu-
ally acquired 100% of it in 1997, the same year a com-
pany controlled by Rupert Murdoch’s News Corpora-
tion acquired a controlling stake in the satellite 
subscription TV operator, Sky, from the American me-
dia (Time Warner, TCI) and telecoms (Bell Atlantic, 
Ameritech) companies that founded it (Withers, 1997). 
In Australia, almost all the later expansions of televi-
sion services had also been delivered by incumbents. 
These included colour TV in the 1970s, extra services in 
country areas in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and 
digital TV in the 2000s, as discussed below. Even multi-
channel subscription TV services, initially offered by the 
entrant Australis in 1995, had consolidated into Foxtel, 
controlled by the biggest local telco Telstra and biggest 
newspaper publisher, Murdoch’s News Limited.  
Yet, like television itself in the late 1950s and 1960s, 
already an international phenomenon when it launched 
officially in A/NZ, Netflix was a known outsider. By No-
vember 2014, it had more than 50 million streaming cus-
tomers in the US and overseas, including the VPN sub-
scribers in A/NZ discussed above. The company’s first 
program commissions, House of Cards and Orange Is the 
New Black, had screened on other television and video 
services in Australia and New Zealand and were well 
known as Netflix shows. This time, offering the next 
generation of TV services, A/NZ incumbents were the 
start-ups trying to create awareness for new brands in 
their own backyards: “The outsider, Netflix, was already 
at home” (Given, Brealey, & Gray, 2015, pp. 6-7). 
Also like the introduction of television, although 
Netflix seemed to be known, the versions that Australi-
ans and New Zealanders got to see were not the same 
as the one they thought they knew. Licensing deals al-
ready in place meant some of the marquee content 
available to Netflix subscribers in other countries was 
not available to early A/NZ customers. This even in-
cluded some Netflix-commissioned shows, where exist-
ing series had been licensed exclusively to local sub-
scription TV operators, leading to considerable 
confusion about where viewers would find forthcoming 
series. Some recent Disney and Marvel programs that 
were part of Netflix’ Australian service could not be 
screened in New Zealand because Sky TV held the rele-
vant rights (Pullar-Strecker, 2015b). It would take time 
for the official, local Netflix’s to look like the US or UK 
Netflix that many had been subscribing to via VPNs, but 
also for the reality of Netflix’s wide and deep but not 
infinite content offerings to be understood. 
Historically, television services around the world 
had diverged as revenues grew, local production skills 
developed, policy measures were implemented and 
took effect, and audiences revealed and learned dis-
tinctive tastes. Netflix’s premise was that, as territorial 
licensing deals expired, its services around the world 
would converge towards a global service, satisfying the 
increasingly global tastes of local viewers. 
2.5. Dealing with Netflix 
Soon after Netflix launched, market researchers, finan-
cial analysts and journalists began reporting “explosive 
adoption of the platform” and “stunning growth” 
(White, 2015). Here again was an urgent narrative 
about the end of television, founded in the arrival of a 
different kind of television. “Netflix is the new black”, 
declared Roy Morgan Research, estimating the compa-
ny signed nearly 300,000 Australian customers in its 
first month, April 2015. In New Zealand, 164,000 
households were estimated to be subscribing in the 
first three months, 9.4% of the roughly 1.75 million to-
tal (Roy Morgan Research, 2015c). After seven months, 
Morgan estimated more than a million Australian 
households were subscribing, 11.4% of the 9 million to-
tal (Roy Morgan Research, 2015b, 2015d). Broadband 
customers complained that their access speeds had 
slowed; telcos confirmed the surge in online video con-
sumption (Bingemann, 2015). 
It appeared clear enough that Netflix was signing up 
many more subscribers than its local SVOD rivals, Pres-
to and Stan in Australia and Lightbox and Neon in New 
Zealand, although the battle for customers spawned a 
war over metrics. Mumbrella deputy editor Nic Chris-
tensen thought the figures published by operators 
were “at best confusing and at worse close to mislead-
ing”. Different SVOD providers cited ‘gross sign-ups’ 
(which included people who had churned or were on 
free trials), ‘total customers’ (which included TVOD 
customers who had bought a single movie as well as 
ongoing SVOD subscribers), ‘paying subscribers’ and 
‘people using the service’ (paying subscribers multi-
plied by the average number of people in households). 
Netflix, “the godfather of secrecy in this space”, pub-
lished no breakdowns of its Australian and New Zea-
land subscribers at all. “SVOD offers a level of targeted 
ad delivery that is unrivalled in traditional television” 
plus a lucrative side business trading the data, wrote 
Christensen. But for that to work, “unanimity about the 
metric” for subscription streaming and “basic level 
transparency” were essential. Christensen wanted 
‘paying subscribers’ to acquire the same kind of univer-
sal currency for SVOD services that ‘unique audience’ 
and ‘time spent’ metrics had acquired for AVOD (ad-
supported VOD) services like YouTube and catch-up TV. 
The fact that most SVOD services did not carry adver-
tising was not a reason for accepting spurious audience 
data: “While it may not be part of their immediate 
 Media and Communication, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 3, Pages 109-122 116 
business plans…at some point the sheer weight of 
money being offered by advertisers will be too great” 
(Christensen, 2015). 
The good news for video service providers was that 
some of the SVOD customers were paying for televi-
sion for the first time. In Australia, where household 
penetration of cable and satellite subscription TV had 
been stuck at around 30% of households for years, 
over 40% had signed up to some kind of subscription 
video service, including cable or satellite TV or SVOD, a 
few months after Netflix launched (Roy Morgan Re-
search, 2015b). The bad news for incumbent subscrip-
tion and broadcast TV operators was a significant de-
cline in television viewing, especially linear viewing. 
Australia’s TV ratings provider reported that ‘total TV 
screen use’ for all Australians fell nearly three-and-a-
half hours (from an average of 123 hours 43 minutes to 
120 hours 19 minutes per month) between the third 
quarter of 2014 and the same period in 2015—live TV 
viewing fell around 6 hours, playback rose 11 minutes 
and ‘other screen use’ rose 2 hours 18 minutes 
(OzTAM, RegionalTAM, Nielsen, 2015). 
Roy Morgan Research CEO Michele Levine specu-
lated that the media behaviour of 14–24 year-olds 
“may foreshadow the wider norms ten years from 
now”, noting the average time this age group spent 
with TV, radio and print media a decade ago resembled 
the wider national norm in 2015. According to her da-
ta, Australians aged 14–24 now spend more time 
online than with all other traditional media combined: 
27.6 hours on average each week using the internet 
(much more than the 17.9 hours spent by all Australi-
ans aged 14+), 12.5 hours a week with TV (much less 
than the 18.8 hours spent by all Australians 14+), 6.7 
hours with radio (12.8 hours for all 14+) and less than 
an hour and half with newspapers or magazines (3.4 
hours) (Roy Morgan Research, 2015a). 
Citi Research analyst Justin Diddams predicted that 
more Australian households would be subscribing to an 
SVOD service within three years than to the 20-year old 
dominant subscription TV company Foxtel. This didn’t 
mean “the death of Foxtel but it means an explosion in 
content consumption…in the 70 per cent of households 
that don’t pay anything today”. Nor did it mean free-to-
air television was dying, but growth in broadcasters’ 
earnings was likely to be limited, because “expensive, 
risky, cutting-edge content” would be needed to keep 
their linear channels relevant (White, 2015; White & 
McIntyre, 2015a, 2015b). The local SVOD services an-
nounced they would commission more local programs 
(Bodey, 2015); departing ABC managing director Mark 
Scott called for debate about the idea of “a digital con-
tent fund, requiring new digital content companies, 
many of which dwarf their Australian competitors, to 
contribute a percentage of revenue to support local con-
tent requirements” (Scott, 2015); Netflix announced it 
was backing a TV series to be directed by Australian Baz 
Luhrmann (The Great Gatsby, Australia, Moulin Rouge!, 
Romeo+Juliet), about 1970s New York. It would be “a 
mythic saga of how New York at the brink of bankruptcy 
gave birth to hip-hop, punk and disco—told through the 
lives and music of the South Bronx kids who changed the 
city, and the world…forever” (Stanhope, 2015). 
3. The Digital Moment 
Digital television technology was expected to change 
television forever and did, though not in precisely the 
ways many anticipated. It originated in efforts to im-
prove TV’s image quality. The only way to achieve the 
improvements sought within the constraints of existing 
channel allocations was to use digital techniques. By 
using them, many other possibilities were created, with 
both revolutionary and evolutionary capabilities and 
consequences. For TV broadcasters, there were threats 
as well as opportunities. If digital TV was a revolution 
and TV-as-we-knew-it was going to end, it was hard for 
broadcasters to argue that they should be the only en-
terprises able to use the technology. If it was an evolu-
tion, a technical upgrade to a well-established medium 
that would not fundamentally transform it, it might be 
difficult to expect governments to offer regulatory fa-
vours and subsidies to help make it happen. 
In the late 1990s, digital TV pioneers emphasized 
the capacity for it to put television in the centre of the 
digital revolution that garnered so much attention af-
ter Netscape’s 1995 initial public offering. Digital 
transmission was widely described as the most im-
portant development in television since the medium 
was introduced. In the UK, one of the first countries to 
launch the technology in 1998, an early policy paper 
said it would provide many people with “their first ex-
perience of the full potential of the information super-
highways” (Department of National Heritage, 1995, p. 
1). Australia’s communications minister promised this 
“quantum leap in television technology” would provide 
the capacity “for the humble television set to become a 
central information point in every home” (Alston, 
1998). (End-of-television narratives often recall eras 
when TV sets were ‘humble’!) 
After the telecoms and internet crash in 2000, the 
collapse of ITV Digital in the UK in 2002, and the disap-
pointing early take-up of digital TV in some territories 
including the US, Sweden, Finland and Australia (see 
Starks, 2013, pp. 42-51), the evolutionary nature of dig-
ital TV transmission was emphasized more strongly. 
Announcing New Zealand’s plans for digital TV in 2006, 
a decade after Britain’s, the broadcasting minister said 
the move to digital television was “essential to securing 
the future viability of free-to-air broadcasting in New 
Zealand”, and the continuing strength of public broad-
casting’s place in it (Maharey, 2006). TV would change, 
but modestly. Any larger transformations would come 
from what was done with spectrum vacated by broad-
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casters. By the time switchover was completed in Aus-
tralia and New Zealand at the end of 2013, it was diffi-
cult to get anyone to notice. Digital TV was just TV. 
Yet TV, plainly, was not what it had been. Australi-
ans and New Zealanders had replaced their TV sets and 
chosen to watch the increased range of free-to-air 
channels on wide-screen receivers with much better 
image and sound quality. Given the relative sizes of the 
advertising markets and government budgets, Australi-
ans got many more new ad-supported and public-
funded channels than New Zealand (Given & Norris, 
2010): by November 2014, free-to-air digital multichan-
nels achieved a share of more than a quarter of the Aus-
tralian viewing audience from 6p.m. to midnight, com-
pared with about 56% for the main channels and 17% 
for subscription TV channels (OzTAM, 2014). Many more 
households in both countries came to rely on satellite 
signals for their TV reception, because both govern-
ments decided to subsidise multichannel satellite pack-
ages. This enabled them to reduce the number of terres-
trial TV transmission sites and hence frequencies used 
and so increase the amount of spectrum vacated, the 
‘digital dividend’. Australia’s early emphasis on HDTV 
and the rapid fall in prices of HD sets meant that a very 
high proportion of the receivers sold were capable of re-
ceiving HD signals, although the wholesale transition to 
HD programming, even in genres like sport, has not oc-
curred. New Zealand’s later start meant it could use the 
DVB-T2 transmission standard from the outset; Australia 
anticipates a further migration to that standard. 
Despite the significance of these changes, as in oth-
er territories, digital broadcasting and the first genera-
tion of digital TV receivers in A/NZ did not themselves 
generate the kinds of changes to television through in-
teractivity, convergence with other media forms, and 
mobile reception that were part of the early rationales 
for digital TV. These things all occurred, but not so much 
within the incumbent TV business as outside it or around 
its edges. TV viewers interacted with TV content and 
each other, but they generally used SMS and then social 
media rather than the ‘red button’ interactivity that digi-
tal television enabled. They integrated amateur and pro-
fessionally-produced content, but were more likely to do 
it using desktop and laptop computers, smartphones 
and tablets, than TV sets. They increasingly watched vid-
eo content on mobile devices, but trials of mobile 
broadcasting services using transmission standards like 
DVB-H did not prove popular. Rather than being in the 
centre of the digital revolution, as the digital TV industry 
and policy pioneers had enthused, broadcast television 
was, to some extent, overrun by it, even as it has adopt-
ed digital tools throughout its production, distribution, 
transmission, sales and marketing activities. 
The scale of that overrunning, at least in the eyes of 
investors, is demonstrated by the stock prices of televi-
sion companies in the region. Shares in Australia’s 
Number 3 commercial network, Network Ten, worth 
around $2.50 a decade ago, ended 2015 at less than 20 
cents (they were consolidated, 1 for 10, in January 
2016). Seven West Media, owner of the top-rating Sev-
en Network, hit a post-GFC low of AU$4 in 2009 before 
strengthening, but were back down below 80 cents in 
late 2015. The Nine Network was recapitalized in a new 
company floated in 2013; the shares ended 2015 below 
their issue price. The gloom was not restricted to 
broadcast networks. Multichannel subscription opera-
tor Sky TV’s shares fell below NZ$4.50 in December 
2015 after reaching nearly NZ$7 in July 2014 (Murdoch 
sold out in 2013). Broadcast television’s commercial 
decline was also reflected in the long, gentle easing of 
the once-seemingly-unassailable political power that 
helped it to call so many of the policy shots in the de-
bates about digital TV. Some anticipated the complete 
shutdown of analogue TV and vacating of large amounts 
of spectrum for alternate purposes would simply lead to 
new spectrum demands by the old incumbents. Re-
quests were made, but the Australian and New Zealand 
governments resisted them. Generous ‘digital dividends’ 
were engineered, broadcasters shut down the last of 
their analogue transmitters in December 2013, the va-
cated spectrum was re-auctioned, and the mobile 
broadband companies that acquired it launched more 
affordable, higher bandwidth services that inspired and 
helped manage surging mobile video consumption. 
The devices many consumers used to watch mobile 
video, beginning with the iPhone launched in 2007 and 
joined by smartphones from other suppliers and later 
tablets, gave concrete expression to the “alternate us-
es of vacated spectrum” that figured prominently in 
debates about the benefits of digital TV switchover. 
That the spectrum once used for ‘television’ was rede-
ployed for ‘non-television’ purposes in which incum-
bent television broadcasters had such a direct interest 
confirmed James Bennett’s observation that digital TV 
switchover, based on “a traditional understanding of 
television as the ‘box in the corner’ [a]rguably…tell[s] us 
only half the story”. Digital TV was not just TV. “Televi-
sion as digital media must be understood as a non-site-
specific, hybrid cultural and technological form that 
spreads across multiple platforms” (Bennett, 2011, p. 2). 
As a “non-site-specific, hybrid cultural and techno-
logical form”, digital television followed the interna-
tional experience of analogue television before it. “Fig-
ures from official switchover programs…call our 
attention not only to some of the not-so-radical shifts 
that television’s digitization engenders, but also to the 
fact that such transformations occur within specific na-
tional and local configurations”, writes Bennett. The 
broad policy agenda was global—introduce digital 
transmission, eventually shutdown analogue and real-
locate the spectrum for alternate purposes—but the 
precise policy elements were regional, national and lo-
cal. “Although a variety of international contexts might 
all promote the digital switchover by emphasizing the 
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benefits that digital TV will bring consumers…and gov-
ernments…the experience of digital TV differs greatly 
according to geography, but also to economic and cul-
tural factors that speak to the role television has 
played in defining modernity” (Bennett, 2011, p. 3). 
Analysing digital TV policy in the UK and the US, 
Hernan Galperin found little evidence that these nation 
states had yielded their capacity to shape their com-
munications sectors to “the twin forces of technologi-
cal change and globalisation” (Galperin, 2004, p. 272). 
Despite claims of global convergence in the regulation 
of media and telecoms industries towards ‘common 
rules based on free market principles’, he concluded: 
“Faced with common macroeconomic challenges 
and a technology that challenged the fundamental 
parameters of the analog[ue] TV regime, nations 
forged distinct policy responses that in many ways 
strengthened their pre-existing differences in the 
organisation of broadcasting.….Such resilience of 
national media systems should not be surprising. In 
a sense, our modernist fascination with technology 
often obscures the fact that, while technological in-
novations are universal and rather easily transfera-
ble across borders, the economic and political ar-
rangements that define how these innovations are 
deployed are not.…Whereas many globalisation 
scholars would predict a gradual vanishing of histor-
ical differences in the organisation of media sys-
tems across nations—what the more alarmist of 
them would associate with an irreversible trend 
toward worldwide cultural homogenisation—we 
find that the transition to digital TV has been a ve-
hicle for cementing those differences….[T]he future 
of television seems less wedded to the evolution of 
technology or global market forces than to politics, 
as usual.” (Galperin, 2004, pp. 275-276, 285-287) 
Galperin’s conclusion is convincing for international 
policies about digital TV, but, so far, is less persuasive for 
the present ‘end of television’ moment, the introduction 
of streaming video services. It may even be less persua-
sive for policies at the end of the digital TV transition 
than it was for those at the start. Australia and New Zea-
land launched digital TV years apart in 2001 and 2008; 
they switched off their last analogue transmitters in the 
same month, December 2013. Netflix launched in both 
markets simultaneously 15 months later.  
This may be scant evidence or simply a reflection of 
the increasing closeness of the two countries’ econo-
mies over the three decades since they established 
what is now one of the most liberal free trade regions 
in the world. But it may also reflect significant shifts in 
the nature of some of the brands, services and devices 
that have risen to prominence since the Dot Com crash 
in the early 2000s. NBC and CBS did not operate ser-
vices in Australia or New Zealand and were never sig-
nificant brands there. So discrete were the national 
markets that Australia and the US could both have 
large ABC’s that were completely separate organisa-
tions. International brands existed in media and com-
munications—Hollywood studios like MGM, movie 
franchises like James Bond, stars from Charlie Chaplin 
to Steve McQueen, Nellie Melba to Madonna—but 
rarely for broadcasters or communications companies, 
unless they had imperial origins like the BBC and Cable 
& Wireless. Now, Apple, Amazon, Google, Facebook 
and Netflix are major retail brands in A/NZ and 
throughout much of the world. They all have millions of 
regular overseas customers who expect they will be 
able to continue to use the services when they travel 
internationally—a practice much more common than it 
was even two decades ago. Netflix’s Ted Sarandos 
promotes the idea that no matter where a subscriber 
signs up, “when you push play [Netflix] works every-
where in the world on all different broadband speeds 
on all different devices” (Sarandos, 2015). Mobile de-
vices travel around the world with their owners in ways 
that TV and radio sets rarely did, and need to connect 
seamlessly to mobile and wifi networks using several 
frequency bands. Different receivers have long been 
manufactured to suit incompatible electrical power 
and transmission standards; smartphones and other 
mobile devices are much more likely to incorporate 
multiple standards in models that can be manufac-
tured, sold and used anywhere. Regional and global 
harmonisation of the frequency bands used for particu-
lar services and devices helps to reduce their cost, 
hence the intense work Australia put into developing 
the Asia Pacific Telecommunity (APT) plan for the 700 
MHz band vacated by the shutdown of analogue TV in 
many countries (Australian Communications and Media 
Authority, 2015). To undersell these developments, 
while emphasising the intricate government policy ma-
noeuvres about digital switchover, risks mistaking ac-
tivity for impact. As Lotz notes of the US, most of the 
changes in industry operation that she discusses in The 
Television will be Revolutionised did not result from the 
competition that regulatory change was supposed to 
inspire; “instead they came largely from the actions 
of…consumer electronics and computing…companies 
outside the [regulator’s] purview” (Lotz, 2014, p. 52). 
Netflix is the exemplar of this trend. 
The largely domestic identity of the enterprises that 
dominated national broadcasting systems and debates 
about digital TV in the 1990s and early 2000s was not 
an accident, it was policy. National governments creat-
ed national public broadcasters and, even in the US, 
prohibited or limited foreign ownership of broadcast-
ing enterprises. In the US, the companies that have 
come to dominate online music, books, video, search 
and social media since then are also domestic, often 
headquartered in the same state that still houses some 
of the giants of the movie and broadcasting businesses. 
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In A/NZ markets, the same California-based companies 
dominate digital services, but, unlike the TV broadcast-
ers, they are distant. This may prove to be an outcome 
of some cultural consequence. In his book about Jim 
Clark, a co-founder of Silicon Graphics, Netscape and 
Healtheon/WebMD, one of the most engaging chroni-
clers of commerce in the digital age, Michael Lewis, 
wrote “The business of creating and foisting new tech-
nology upon others that goes on in Silicon Valley is 
near the core of the American experience. It is distinc-
tively us” (Lewis, 2000, p. xii). 
4. Conclusions 
For the TV 2025 study referred to earlier, interviewees 
were asked if, in 2025, there would there still be some-
thing we call ‘television’. Intel’s Tawny Schlieski re-
sponded “TV for me is episodic content in our home. 
It’s a unique form that breaks away from the plays and 
movies that preceded it. It provides us with characters 
and continuity that we want to invite into our intimate 
spaces over and over again. That isn’t going any-
where.” Joshua Green, from Arnold Worldwide, co-
author of YouTube (2007) and Spreadable Media 
(2013), thought, “Television has trodden the edge of 
significant revolution its entire life. It has never been 
static. I think it’s got at least another decade in it.” 
“Consumers will still call it TV”, said AOL Platforms’s 
Mitch Waters, “but whether people in our [advertising] 
industry will view it that way, I’m not sure”. “As a de-
vice and as a medium,” said Yahoo!7’s Arul Baskaran, “I 
think television as we know it is going to disappear” 
(Given et al., 2015, p. 11). 
Television in Australia and New Zealand did not end 
with digital transmission and it is not ending with Net-
flix or Fetch TV, but nor is the new television simply 
television—as some have suggested Michael Wolff ar-
gues, unfairly equating his recent title with his argu-
ment (Wolff, 2015). In Australia, New Zealand and eve-
rywhere else, television is and has been, in James 
Bennett’s phrase, a “hybrid media form” (Bennett, 
2011, p. 7). It is what Milly Buonanno calls an “open 
medium…resistant both to theoretical imposition and 
to the empirical experience of fixed, essential and un-
changing characteristics” (Buonanno, 2008, p. 41). Dis-
agreements about the phases of its history in different 
parts of the world often reflect disagreements about 
the truth of this central proposition. There is no classic 
form of television, touched at some point in every TV 
market, away from which they are all now speeding. 
There is, instead, a set of technologies, social practices, 
cultural forms, industries, institutions, words and ideas 
that constantly transform, finding new shapes that 
sometimes embody features of old ones. 
Digital TV, Fetch TV and Netflix offer different tele-
vision futures. The policy-driven digital switchover pro-
cess was intended to make incumbent broadcasters 
central to the continuing structure of television in the 
two markets. The compelling reason for doing so was 
that it gave this most popular media form, the largest 
source of finance for local audio-visual production and a 
crucial contributor to cultural activity and understand-
ing, the best chance to adapt to the transformations of 
the digital era. The risk was that broadcast networks 
would over-use the control to try to over-determine the 
outcome. Before the transition to all-digital transmission 
was complete, it was becoming clear that broadcasters 
had overplayed their hands, trying to do too much de-
termining with the politicians who had played such a big 
part in crafting their medium, while adapting too little in 
the market place. They thought they were television, 
and for a long time they were. Right now they seem out 
of time. Many others can do what they do, and some of 
the biggest influences on their business are not just out 
of their hands but outside their places. 
Fetch TV is one kind of response to the radical pluri-
formity of contemporary television, from an enterprise 
that believes television will endure, though perhaps 
with a different moniker. It seeks to muster all the tel-
evisions under a single service, bill and brand—the big 
screens in living rooms and the mobile screens in peo-
ple’s hands, the channels, programs and user-
generated content that is worth watching wherever it 
comes from, even the brands they crave, like Netflix. 
Fetch hopes that even if viewers and users stop talking 
about it as TV they won’t stop watching and interacting 
with it and recommending it to others. 
At the time of writing, the most successful chal-
lenge to television in A/NZ was coming from a compa-
ny that talks up the end of television (Guthrie, 2015), 
but serves up a very specific form of it. Netflix offers 
drama, documentary and children’s shows, a much 
more limited range of genres than broadcast or linear 
subscription operators; it offers them for a monthly all-
you-can-eat price; and it offers them on-demand. Ted 
Sarandos says they are not interested in news—“The 
newsgathering space…is fairly commoditized and not 
particularly in line with our on-demand model”. Nor 
are they especially interested in sport. “The leagues 
have all the pricing power in that business forever [but] 
if there was a model where we could create our own 
sports league that might be interesting.” Further, “on-
demand doesn’t make the sports experience better for 
the viewer. It’s the liveness of it” (Sarandos, 2015). 
Netflix is the opposite of Fetch. It is trying to be one 
kind of TV rather than all. Yet this constraint, this clari-
ty of focus, does not imply fixity. The company has al-
ready undergone several profound strategic shifts, first 
transforming itself from a DVD rental company in the 
US (though it still has DVD mail order customers) to an 
online digital provider, then from a domestic to an in-
ternational service, then again from a reseller of other 
people’s content to a producer of its own (Keating, 
2013). It is not just that the current SVOD business 
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model appears to be working, because it is not working 
well for others. Netflix’ A/NZ clone Quickflix moved ear-
ly, adapted constantly and attracted many powerful 
supporters along the way: its shares were down from 
more than 20 cents in 2007 to just one cent in late 2015. 
The political responses that Galperin would antici-
pate are already apparent. Both New Zealand and Aus-
tralia decided in 2015 to extend their value-added tax-
es to “offshore intangible supplies”, ensuring that 
digital content services like Netflix and iTunes would 
have to charge the same VAT as their A/NZ-based 
competitors. Incumbents called it “levelling the playing 
field”; others called it the “Netflix tax”. While plainly 
prompted by the arrival of Netflix in 2015, the 
measures also made New Zealand and Australia early 
adopters of potentially global guidelines for business-
to-consumer supplies of digital products and services 
being developed by the OECD (Sanyal, 2015). The Nine 
Network’s chief executive declared that without 
changes to Australian media laws, Netflix’s success in 
the local market would jeopardise Australian jobs and 
local programming. “Things are getting hairy amid in-
creasing competition from overseas entrants”, he 
warned. Netflix employed just one person in Australia 
and no journalists, was taxed differently and, because 
it did not use spectrum, paid no licence fee like TV and 
radio broadcasters (Davidson & Crowe, 2016). 
Painted as a homogenous global conduit, Netflix 
talked of accelerating the distinctiveness of the services 
it was launching in a dizzying number of countries. “I like 
to say we differentially understand the marketplace”, 
Sarandos told a UBS conference in December 2015. “I 
think every time we launch a new country we learn 
more about that region. There is very little that you can 
learn about operating in Australia by operating in Mexi-
co.” He wanted “people to love Netflix because they 
love the programming on Netflix and if part of that 
means local language programming versus subtitled and 
dubbed shows then we want to be part of that as well. 
And I think we can, we have the scale to do that.” But so 
too, the company had found in Japan that whereas:  
“90 per cent of the box office is Japanese film and 
95 per cent of TV watching…is Japanese televi-
sion…we are doing 30 to 50 per cent watching with 
non-Japanese programming….So I think that this 
very concentrated local viewing is more a reflection 
of the business climate than its local taste….The 
more international we are and the more global we 
are the more we can get better and better at that 
which I think is the next phase of film entertain-
ment.” (Sarandos, 2015) 
This is the paradox of TV after TV: the more successful 
this new, global form of television is, the greater will be 
its capacity to assume from local incumbents the role 
they reluctantly accepted decades ago, of distinguish-
ing their television from what was available elsewhere. 
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